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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the evolving interregional partnership between the European 
Union (EU) and Mercosur in the context of the changing systemic constraints of the 
“transatlantic triangle”. It examines to what extent the EU-US relationship constrains 
the European “governance externalization” strategy towards Mercosur, and how the 
rise of Brazil affects the competing EU-US interregional strategies vis-à-vis the Southern 
Cone. Building on a realist declination of the “new regionalist” approach, the paper 
argues that the changing power configuration of the “transatlantic triangle” has a 
twofold impact on EU-led interregionalism: first, in the absence of the US-linked 
structural pressures stemming from the negotiation process of the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), the EU is expected to reduce its commitment to the political 
strengthening of the EU-Mercosur interregional partnership; second, the rise of Brazil 
constitutes the key driver behind the European shift from “pure interregionalism” to 
“selective bilateralism”. As a generalizable conclusion, the systemic constraints 
imposed by the “transatlantic triangle” relationship on the EU-Mercosur interregional 
partnership entail a pessimistic outlook for interregionalism both as a long-term 
relational pattern and as a strategy to foster global governance based on 
“regionalized multilateralism”.  
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1.  Introduction: the EU-US-Southern Cone “transatlantic triangle” 
 
“Two foreign gentlemen court the beautiful Latina (Latin 
America). One, the European, is an old rich gentleman, 
cultured, polite and of delicate manners, but a little slow and 
hesitant. The other, the American, is a young billionaire, brave 
and adventurous, but lacking in manners, and he can be at 
times harsh and even brutal in his ways.”1 
 
Shaped by a prominently rising Brazil, the Southern Cone2 is emerging as a crucial 
“point of intersection” of the EU-US “rival (inter)-regionalisms”.3 Since the early 1990s, 
the post-Cold War international systemic changes provided a set of structural 
incentives for the establishment of a veritable “politics of new regionalism” in the 
Americas.4 On the one hand, the US-led renewed “western hemispheric” policy, 
launched through the 1990 “Enterprise for the Americas” initiative, culminated in the 
deadlocked FTAA negotiations; on the other hand, the EU’s strategy of “governance 
externalization” towards Latin America implied European support to Latin American 
sub-regional integration processes, namely to the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur5).  
The triangular South American “politics of new regionalism” is more and more 
challenging the feasibility of the EU’s ambitions to project its intra-regional multilateral 
governance through specifically targeted interregional policies. Thus, in an analytical 
perspective, the Southern Cone sub-regional context provides the most illuminating 
case study to uncover both the geostrategic implications of the emerging EU-US 
                                                            
1 A. Valladao, “Le triangle atlantique: l’émergence de l’Amerique latine dans les relations 
Europe-Etats-Unis”, Les notes de l’Ifri, no. 6, Paris, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 
1999, p. 6.  
2 As a preliminary geographic terminological clarification, the paper will refer to the notions 
as follows: “Latin America” encompasses the Iberian-speaking “cultural region” from Mexico 
to Tierra del Fuego; “South America” refers to “Latin America” with the exclusion of Mexico 
and the Caribbean; the notion of “Southern Cone”, which traditionally includes Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay, will also embrace Brazil. Such an inclusive notion of “Southern 
Cone” is twofold justified: geographically, the “Southern Cone” includes the whole area 
south of the Tropic of Capricorn, thus the southern part of Brazil; geopolitically, the Mercosur 
integration process binds Brazil to an integrated Southern Cone South American sub-region.  
3 See J. Van Scherpenberg and E. Thiel, Towards Rival Regionalism? US and EU Regulatory 
Regime Building, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998. 
4 S. Santander, Le régionalisme sud-américain, l’Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis, Bruxelles, 
Editions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut d’Etudes Européennes, 2007.  
5 J. Gruegel, “New Regionalism and Modes of Governance: Comparing US and EU Strategies 
in Latin America”, European Journal of International Relations, 2004, vol. 10, no. 4, p. 604.  
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“interregional competition” and the empirical limits to the European conception of 
interregionalism as a paradigm to foster a global-governance system change.6  
This paper aims to analyze EU-Mercosur interregional relations in the context of the 
diverging EU-US policies towards an increasingly Brazil-led Southern Cone. It 
addresses a twofold research question: to what extent does the EU-US relationship 
constrain the European interregional engagement with Mercosur; and how does the 
rise of Brazil affect the competing EU-US interregional strategies vis-à-vis the Southern 
Cone? It is argued that the transforming power configuration within the “(trans)-
Atlantic triangle”7 has a twofold impact on the EU-Mercosur interregional project. 
First, in light of the EU-US interregional divergence, the EU policy of “governance 
externalization” towards Mercosur is likely to be reconciled within the framework of 
the transatlantic link or “Euro-America system”:8 in the absence of the structural 
pressures stemming from the FTAA negotiation process, the EU is expected to reduce 
its commitment to the “EU-ization of Mercosur”.9 Second, the rise of Brazil as an 
autonomous regional and global power is expected to affect both the EU and the 
US interregional projects for the governance of the Southern Cone. It constitutes the 
key driver behind the EU’s shift from “pure interregionalism” to “selective 
bilateralism”. 
This paper analyzes new regionalism and interregionalism both as structural post-
Cold War inter-state relational patterns and as a “conceptual frame for the 
comparison” of EU and the US policies towards the Southern Cone.10 It is assumed 
that international actors’ respective interregional policies are driven by both intra-
regional and extra-regional factors. In particular, the EU, being a multilateral entity 
internally, is keen, in the absence of structural constraints, to “externalize” its internal 
                                                            
6 N.A. De Flers and E. Regelsberger, “The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation”, in C. Hill and K. 
Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004, pp. 317-342.  
7 When inventing the notion of “Atlantic Triangle” in 1951, Arthur Whitaker regretted the lack 
of a triangular Atlantic cooperative framework. See A. Whitaker cited in Santander, op.cit., p. 
52. This paper conceives the notion of “transatlantic triangle” as a set of three bi-regional 
relations, implying both cooperative and competitive dynamics.  
8 S. McGuire and M. Smith, The European Union and the United States: Convergence and 
Competition in the Global Arena, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
9 EU-ization is here operationalized as the extent to which the EU provides the “exporting 
forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe 
beyond the European territory”. See P. Olson, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, Arena 
Working Papers, Oslo, 2001, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm, retrieved 
26/2/2010.   
10 Gruegel, “New Regionalism and Modes of Governance”, op.cit., p. 604.  
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binding multilateral model in dealing with other regions; in a similar fashion, the US, as 
a nation-state attached to a more traditional conception of sovereignty, 
approaches its interregional relations in a classical power-based perspective. Thus, 
contrary to the realist assumption implying the absolute separation between internal 
and external policy-making structures, interregionalism appears as an intrinsically 
“intermestic” phenomenon.11  
In addressing these research questions, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 will 
analyze the diverging EU-US models for the governance of the Southern Cone as 
opposed conceptual poles: on the one hand, the hub-and-spoke US-led “soft (inter)-
regionalism”, which is exemplified by the FTAA project. On the other hand, the 
“deep” EU-backed interregional “equal partnership”, which “transcends power 
inequalities through supranational institution building”.12 Section 3 addresses the 
implications of the changing power configuration of the “transatlantic triangle” on 
the EU-Mercosur relationship. A first sub-part identifies the US-linked systemic pressures 
and its effects, while a second sub-part analyzes the rise of Brazil and the EU’s shift 
from “pure interregionalism” to “selective bilateralism” through the 2007 EU-Brazil 
Strategic Partnership.13 The conclusions elaborate on what the South American case 
study can tell us in general about the emerging EU-US interregional competition and 
the feasibility of the EU-led project to foster a better global governance through 
interregional cooperation. In this sense, the transforming “transatlantic triangle” 
dynamics test the extent to which the EU-led interregionalism might evolve in a set of 
postmodern institutional frameworks as cornerstones of new multilateralism or 
whether the EU-backed model of pure interregionalism is destined to dissolve into a 
more flexible, but less ambitious, mix of bilateralism and region-to-region institutional 
arrangements.   
 
                                                            
11 See J. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, International Security, vol. 24, 
no. 2, 1999, pp. 5-55.  
12 J. Gruegel, “New Regionalism and Modes of Governance”, op.cit., p. 609.  
13 S. Santander, “EU-LA Relations: from Interregionalism to Selective Bilateralism?”, in C. Franck, 
J.C. Defraigne and V. Moriamé (eds.), L'Union Européenne et la montée du régionalisme: 
exemplarité et partenariats, Louvain-la-Neuve, Academia Bruylant, 2009, pp. 263-274.   
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2.    The diverging EU-US interregional designs for the governance of the 
Southern Cone 
 
This section aims to provide a comparative analysis of the EU-US competing 
interregional models for the governance of the Southern Cone. In order to 
categorize the different “ideal types” of interregional cooperation at the 
international level, the section builds on Heiner Hänggi’s distinction between 1) 
“deep” or “pure interregionalism”, characterized by the relations between deeply 
integrated regional groupings; 2) “transregionalism”, characterized by region-to-
region interactions both at the governmental level and at the level of the civil 
society; and 3) “soft” or “quasi-interregionalism”, including hybrid sets of relations 
between weakly institutionalized regional groupings and single great powers.14  
Thus, the chapter scrutinizes the EU and US respective interregional projects in an 
analytical continuum between “soft (inter)-regionalism”, close to the American 
policy preferences, and “deep (inter)-regionalism”, embodied in the EU governance 
externalization strategy towards Mercosur. Sub-chapter 2.1 systematizes the US 
interregional ideal type in terms of “soft hub-and-spoke neo-hegemonic 
interregionalism”, with specific reference to the historic and contemporary US (inter)-
regional strategies towards South America. Sub-chapter 2.2 outlines the European 
ideal-type of interregional relations in terms of a deeply institutionalized interregional 
partnership. The EU-US interregional divergence implies the promotion of an EU-like 
and a NAFTA-like governance for the Southern Cone, in line with diverging EU-US 
geo-strategic interests.  
 
2.1    The US hub-and-spoke interregional paradigm: combining new regionalism 
and Panamericanism  
Historically, the United States has hardly conceived regionalism as an integral part of 
its foreign economic policy. Indeed, the rapid development of a North American 
regional concept in the late 1980s partly originated from an American reactive 
attitude vis-à-vis the completion of the Single European Market:15 as Mario Telò has 
                                                            
14 H. Hänggi, “Interregionalism: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives”, St. Gallen, University 
of St. Gallen, 2000, http://www.ipw.unisg.ch/org/ipw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/ 
h%C3%A4nggi/$FILE/Haenggi.pdf, retrieved 24/10/2009, p. 3.  
15 Alberta Sbragia defines this reactive American regionalist attitude as a “domino effect” of 
the European regionalism. See A.M. Sbragia, “European Union and NAFTA”, in M. Telò (ed.), 
European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-
hegemonic Era, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, p. 156.  
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pointed out, the creation of NAFTA constituted a major turning point in the American 
foreign economic policy, whereby the US “resigned itself to regionalism”.16  
Such an abrupt conversion to regionalism is linked to what Robert Gilpin defines as a 
“neo-hegemonic attitude”:17 once acknowledged the relative decline of the post-
war US hegemonic cycle (which is conventionally linked to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system), the US engaged with an assertive grand design, aimed at 
promoting a network of “hub-and-spoke” regional trade agreements.18 The 
“unipolarism through new regionalism” strategy targeted two main regional contexts. 
First, since the early 1990s the greatest priority for the US foreign economic policy 
remained the East Asian exchequer, where the alleged negative impact of “fortress-
type” trade agreements led to the foundation of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) interregional dialogue forum. Second, with respect to the Latin 
American context, the 1990 bipartisan “Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” implied 
the corroboration of the US dominance in what the Monroe Doctrine portrayed as a 
“US courtyard”.  
The peculiar combination of “new regionalism” and “Panamericanism” largely 
defines the US interregional policy towards South America, which may be summed 
up by the formula of “soft hub-and-spoke neo-hegemonic interregionalism”.19 The 
most tangible manifestation of this specific US interregional attitude is retraceable in 
the US-backed proposal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas. The project of a 
western hemispheric continental free trade area was officially launched under the 
Clinton Administration at the Organization of American States Summit of Miami in 
1994, but gained public attention only at the Quebec City Summit in 2001, under the 
G.W. Bush Administration. The FTAA project sought to enforce the US-led neo-liberal 
globalization according to the “open regionalism doctrine”.20 
Hence, the US-led interregionalism was instrumentally conceived to open 
traditionally protectionist markets (such as Mexico and the Southern Cone), as well 
as to establish a form of continental Pax Americana in the post-Cold War pro-liberal 
                                                            
16 M. Telò, Europe: a Civlian Power?, European Union, Global Governance, World Order, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 149.  
17 See R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1981, pp. 17-18.  
18 On the US post-Cold War grand strategy see E.B. Kapstein. and M. Mastanduno (eds.), 
Unipolar Politics:  Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2003, pp. 319-352. 
19 Santander, Le régionalisme sud-américain, l’Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis, op.cit., p. 6.  
20 F. Bergsten, “Open Regionalism”, The World Economy, vol. 20, n0. 5, 1997, pp. 545-565. 
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climate, where the triumph of free market governance was epitomized by the idea 
of the “end of History”.21 In a realist perspective, a Panamerican US-led sphere of 
influence represented the only credible counterweight to the emerging European 
and East Asian economic poles. American-led interregionalism under the G.W. Bush 
Administration abandoned the “identity-building” logic, which was a mark of 
previous American-driven regional and interregional constructions.22 The weak 
institutionalization and the perpetuation of power asymmetries and trade 
imbalances within US-backed regional cooperation frameworks constituted a 
fundamental feature of the neo-conservative interregional concept, which implied 
the establishment of US influence in so called “porous regions”.23 According to 
Hänggi’s categorization, US-led interregionalism is better described as “soft 
interregionalism” through which the only remaining superpower cultivates a series of 
hybrid relations with weakly institutionalized regional groupings.24 
The traditional American skepticism about regional cooperation played a significant 
role in shaping the hybrid character of the US-preferred “soft interregionalism”. The 
low degree of institutionalization of US-led interregional cooperation is directly linked 
to the US preference for soft intra-regional cooperation in North America. Unlike the 
European regionalism, the North American regionalization process through NAFTA 
does not present any implication in terms of supranational power delegation and 
sovereignty pooling. Indeed, the US mistrust for pooled and shared sovereignty is 
inextricably related to what Robert Keohane has defined as the “Euro-American 
sovereignty divergence”.25  
Therefore, the US has negatively regarded identity-building regional integration in 
Latin America, where a deliberate divide-and-rule policy was put in place since the 
1960s. Empirical evidence of such US hostility towards South American regionalism is 
to be found in the American controversial approach towards the Council for 
Economic Cooperation in Latin America (CECLA) and the Andean Pact. 
                                                            
21 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and Last Man, New York, Harper, 1992.  
22 Unlike the G.W. Bush Administration’s conception of “new regionalism”, the long-term 
project of the Clinton Administration’s regional policy was the establishment of a North 
American Community which could have eventually led to a new interregional paradigm, 
similar to the European one. See R.A. Pastor, Toward a North American Community: Lessons 
from the Old World to the New, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 2001. 
23 P. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 2005.  
24 Hänggi, “Interregionalism”, op.cit., p. 3.  
25 R. Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the World Order”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002, pp. 743-765. 
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Furthermore, as Johan Gruegel has argued, a consistent correlation exists between 
the US-led “soft regionalism” and the US-led “soft interregionalism”,26 whereby NAFTA 
can be seen as an intermediary step towards an FTAA.27 In Mario Telò’s words, “the 
FTAA interregional project can be seen as a continental-size NAFTA, which interprets 
regionalism through the minimalist vision of the US”.28 
In sum, the American ideal type of (inter)-regional cooperation is characterized by 
three key features: 1) the insertion of interregionalism in a global neo-hegemonic 
and neo-liberal grand strategy, 2) the hub-and-spoke structure of US-led 
interregional cooperation, and 3) the soft degree of institutionalization of both intra-
regional and interregional cooperation frameworks. The ideational foundation of this 
peculiar US approach to “new regionalism” lies in the institutional philosophy 
underpinning the creation of NAFTA. In this sense, FTAA might be seen as a NAFTA-
like interregional project.  
 
2.2    The European model of interregional equal partnership: between myth and 
reality 
The worldwide promotion of regional and interregional cooperation frameworks has 
constantly represented an identifying mark in EU external relations.29 Since the 1970s, 
the European Commission has supported the creation and consolidation of regional 
groupings, notably in the framework the Community-driven development 
cooperation policy.30 The European support to regional cooperation, as part of a 
distinctive European approach to the promotion of regional stability and economic 
development, encompassed a wide geographical scope.  
The patterns of the EU’s global projection gradually evolved into a new paradigm of 
external interaction. The development of the EU-driven interregional relations resulted 
in several forms of “association” between regional groupings, which engendered a 
plethora of region-to-region cooperative frameworks and dialogue fora.31 The rise of 
interregionalism in EU external relations has been powerfully outlined by Aggarwal 
                                                            
26 Gruegel, “New Regionalism and Modes of Governance”, op.cit., pp. 603-626.  
27 W. Grabbendorf, “Biregionalism and US Policy towards Latin America”, in W. Grabbendorf 
and R. Seidelmann (eds.), Relations between the European Union and Latin America: 
Biregionalism in a Changing Global System, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, p. 152. 
28 Telò, “Europe: a Civlian Power?”, op.cit., p. 135.  
29 See M. Farrell, “The EU and Interregional Cooperation: in Search of Global Presence?”, UNU-
CRIS Working Papers, no. 9, Bruges, United Nations University, 2004.   
30 See L. Bartels, “The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union”, European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 18, no. 4, 2007, pp. 715-756.  
31 De Flers and Regelsberger, “The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation”, op.cit., p. 322.  
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and Fogarty, which defined the European Union as the “patron saint of 
interregionalism”32 in international economic relations.  
Interregionalism has represented a way to “externalize” the European regional 
governance.33 The spreading of European standards and norms through the 
multiplication of region-to-region regulatory dialogues remains the most advanced 
instrument of European “normative influence” in an increasingly globalized world.34 
Such a “governance externalization” strategy has been either apologetically 
backed as a way to promote a “civilized” global multilateral market governance35 
or critically denounced as a form of “soft imperialism”.36 
                                                           
As a European trait distincitf in the conduct of international relations, the promotion 
of regional and interregional cooperation is driven by two sets of determinants, the 
first empirical and the second theoretical. As far as the European administrative 
practice is concerned, the European Commission managed to focus, in a public 
rational-choice perspective, on the economic, political and social aspects of 
regional integration, where it could enjoy a comparative advantage over national 
diplomacy. Interregionalism appears as the most powerful tool to frame the 
European identity at the international level. As Regelsberger and De Flers have 
pointed out, “the logic of interregional cooperation derives from the successful 
European model”.37 As a matter of fact, the promotion of regional cooperation 
through inter-regional dialogue fora has ensured a two-way process of legitimization 
of the EU’s external identity. In this sense, interregionalism has shaped not only the 
peculiarly European “structural foreign policy”,38 but also the EU-level public 
diplomacy.39 
 
32 V. Aggarwal and E.K. Fogarty, “The Limits of Interregionalism: The EU and North America”, 
Journal of European Integration, vol. 27, no. 3, 2005, pp. 327-346.  
33 S e e  K .  N i c o l a ï d i s  a n d  M .  E g a n ,  “ T r a n s n a t i o n a l  M a r k e t  G o v e r n a n c e  a n d  R e g i o n a l  P o l i c y  
Externality: Why Recognize Foreign Standards?”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 
3, 2001, p. 454. 
34 Z. Laïdi, La norme sans la force, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2ème édition, 2008, pp. 17-93.  
35 Telò (ed.) The European Union and Global Governance, op.cit.  
36 B. Hettne, “Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models”, in M. Telò 
(ed.), European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a 
Post-hegemonic Era, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, pp. 107-123. 
37 De Flers and Regelsberger, “The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation”, op.cit., p. 319.  
38 S. Keukeleire and J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.  
39 On the interregionalism cooperation as a “brand” for European-level public diplomacy, see 
S.B. Rasmussen, “Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practice”’, 
Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, no. 115, The Hague, Clingendael, July 2009.  
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Though neglected in the first phase of European “regionalist” policies (1970-1980s), 
the Latin American context gradually gained European policymakers’ attention. 
Following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Community (EC), 
South America increasingly constituted a veritable “laboratory” of European-led 
regional and interregional constructions. Following the first generation of region-to-
region dialogue fora, which were established at the ambassadorial level through an 
Italian-Argentine Memorandum of 1968 opening the path towards a CECLA-EC 
dialogue,40 the European interregional policy towards Latin America rapidly grew 
both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
Departing from the US-led hub-and-spoke interregional model, which implied the 
destabilization of Latin American identity-building regional cooperation projects, the 
EU proposed the concept of “balanced equal partnership”. Since the early 1990s, a 
variety of complex interregional cooperative frameworks were established to help 
consolidating Latin American sub-regional integration. In particular, the EU decided 
to prioritize its support in favor of three sub-regional groupings, namely the Andean 
Pact, the Central American Common Market (CAMC) and, above all, Mercosur. The 
1995 EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA) 
represented the first and most advanced example of pure interregionalism. The 
agreement, which came into force after the institutional strengthening of Mercosur 
through the Treaty of Ouro Preto (1994), still governs the relations between the two 
regional groupings and foresees the gradual achievement of a “EU-Southern Cone 
Free Trade Area”.   
What is more, in spite of the marginal South American contributions to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy,41 the European Security Strategy mentions Latin 
American sub-regional cooperation efforts, together with South-East Asian ones, as 
central elements of a “more orderly world”.42 This is why, according to Raimund 
Seidelmann, “the EU-Mercosur interregionalism constitutes the most elaborated, 
                                                            
40 Santander, Le régionalisme sud-américain, l’Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis, op.cit.  
41 As a partial mitigation of the irrelevance of Latin America in the framework of CFSP, one 
might mention Chile’s participation in the European Security and Defence Policy, as foreseen 
by the EU-Chile Association Agreement.  
42 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, retrieved 
14/10/2009, p. 10. 
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political ambitious, and the most challenging case of interregionalism vis-à-vis the 
US”.43 
Theoretically anchored in the model of deep interregionalism, the European model 
for the governance of the Southern Cone might be outlined according to the 
following intra-regional and global implications: 1) intra-regionally, the EU has clearly 
emphasized a policy preference for the institutional strengthening of regional 
integration organizations towards a model of deep regionalism; 2) globally, the EU 
sees region-to-region cooperation as an instrument to promote a more balanced 
and pluralistic world order, based on the development of a “regionalized 
multilateralism”.44 Indeed, interregionalism appears as “a stepping stone to push 
global governance, because it aims towards interest adjustments, common policies 
and multilateral cooperation”.45 From this perspective, EU-Mercosur pure 
interregional relations constitute a decisive test for the overall viability of the EU 
conceptions of interregionalism.  
To recapitulate, the EU-US regional and interregional ideal types are driven by 
opposed “institutional philosophies”, linked to diverging conceptions of sovereignty. 
The US clearly saw the FTAA as an instrument to dilute regionalization in Latin 
America, thus preventing Mercosur from evolving in European-like terms. Both the US 
hub-and-spoke interregionalism and the EU-Mercosur interregional partnership are 
currently facing a transforming power configuration within the “transatlantic triangle” 
system. As Grabbendorf puts it, “the US-EU position in Latin America is much more 
affected by the emerging autonomous South American regionalism than one would 
think possible”.46 
The EU-US interregional rivalry in the Latin American Southern Cone is driven by both 
relative power reasoning and diverging institutional philosophies. As Smith and 
McGuire have pointed out, the emergence of “rival interregionalisms” on the two 
                                                            
43 R. Seidelmann, “EU-Latin American Bi-regionalism as Object and Subject of Global 
Change”, in W. Grabbendorf and R. Seidelmann (eds.), Relations between the European 
Union and Latin America: Biregionalism in a Changing Global System, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
2005, pp. 11-43. 
44 Björn Hettne defines the same concept as “multi-regionalism”. See B. Hettne, “Regionalism 
and World Order”, in M. Farrell, B. Hettne and L. Van Lagenhove (eds.), Global Politics of 
Regionalism: Theory and Practice, London, Pluto Press, 2005, pp. 269-285. 
45 K. Westphal, “Biregionalism: Projecting a New Pattern of Governance? EU’s Relations with 
Latin America”, in W. Grabbendorf and R. Seidelmann (eds.), Relations between the 
European Union and Latin America:  Biregionalism in a Changing Global System, Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 2005, p. 194.  
46 Grabbendorf, “Biregionalism and US policy towards Latin America”, op.cit., p. 219.  
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sides of the Atlantic is the most relevant aspect of an alleged 21st century 
transatlantic rift.47 Arguably, the future geo-economic relevance of Mercosur makes 
regionalism and interregionalism key elements to understand the long-term evolution 
of the transatlantic relationship. In this sense, the evolving “transatlantic-triangle” 
power configuration seems a particularly promising perspective to analyze the 
present and future role of the European Union in the Southern Cone.  
 
3.    The EU-Mercosur pure interregional relationship in the bounds of the 
“transatlantic triangle” system 
This section aims to assess the extent to which the systemic constraints48 of the 
“transatlantic triangle” might impact the EU-Mercosur interregional relationship. In 
order to analyze the EU-US relationship as a constraining determinant of EU-led 
interregionalism, the chapter first identifies the systemic pressures provided by the 
transatlantic relations on the EU’s South American policy as well as its expected 
consequences. Second, it covers the main structural aspects linked to the rise of 
Brazil. The analysis will develop along two systemic dimensions: from an intra-regional 
perspective, the rise of Brazil is analyzed as a constraint to the institutional deepening 
of the Southern Cone regional integration process and as a limit to both “NAFTA-
ization” and “EU-ization” of Mercosur. From an inter-regional perspective, the 
chapter will examine Brazil’s regional and global assertiveness as a constraint to both 
FTAA and EU-Mercosur interregional relations.  
 
3.1  The EU-US system as a structural constraint to the EU-Mercosur interregional 
partnership 
3.1.1  Systemic pressures: the logic of EU-US “rival regionalisms” 
As far as the EU-US rival regional trade policies are concerned, the weight of the “US 
factor” in determining the EU’s interregional policy towards the Southern Cone 
should be critically scrutinized. Arguably, the European Union’s contractual trade 
policy is shaped by a complex mix of internal and external pressures, analytically 
                                                            
47 McGuire and Smith, The European Union and the United States, op.cit.  
48 The concepts of “EU-US system” and “Euro-American system” are interchangeably applied 
by Smith and McGuire to the EU and US diverging (inter-)regional policies at the global stage. 
Nonetheless, the “EU-US system” is more focused on trade policy, while the notion of “Euro-
American system” is broadly applied to the transatlantic political links. See McGuire and 
Smith, The European Union and the United States, op.cit.  
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synthesized by the “multi-level game” metaphor.49 In particular, the weight of 
internal decision-making procedures makes the EU’s trade policy largely dependent 
on inward-looking dynamics rather than outward-looking strategic reasoning.  
                                                           
However, empirical evidence of US-linked systemic pressures is observable in the 
framework of the respective EU-US “governance externalization” strategies towards 
the Southern Cone. Unlike static relative trade positions, the US fears about the 
alleged Europeanization of South American regulatory standards led to a US divide-
and-rule policy vis-à-vis Mercosur: through a set of bilateral relationships, the US relied 
on countries such as Argentina in the 1990s which apply the doctrine of “realismo 
periferico”.50 The American strategy aiming at NAFTA-ization and fragmentation of 
Mercosur clearly limits the European Commission’s efforts towards the strengthening 
of a binding multilateral intra-regional market governance in the Southern Cone.  
Second, if new regionalism is to be analyzed as a multidimensional and 
“extroverted” political phenomenon, i.e. beyond its trade and economic focus, then 
it is clear the EU-US competing geopolitical designs lie behind their respective Latin 
American policies.51 In particular, political pressures on the European pure 
interregional pattern towards Mercosur arise from the US western hemispheric 
geostrategic design, which, in line with the “New Monroe Doctrine”, tries to combine 
both Panamericanism and “interregionalism without supranational institution 
building”.52 The American tactical employment of “selective bilateralism”, which 
targeted Chile, Colombia and Argentina, seems to be functional to pursue such a 
Mercosur-diluting policy; in particular during the 1990s Argentina’s shift from a 
confrontational anti-American foreign policy to the policy of “realismo periferico” 
adopted by the Menem Administration53 favored the establishment of a “privileged” 
US-Argentine partnership, which culminated in the 1994 American proposition to 
 
49 See A. Young, "What Game? By Which Rules? Adaptation and Flexibility in the EC's Foreign 
Economic Policy", in M. Knodt and S. Princen (eds.), Understanding the European Union's 
External Relations, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 54-71. 
50 With reference to the triangular relationship between the US, Argentina and Brazil, Escudé 
defines as “realismo periferico” the rational choice of bandwagoning global powers against 
the influence of a potentially rising regional power. C. Escudé, “Realismo periferico- una 
filosofía de política exterior para estados débiles”, Buenos Aires, Universidad del CEMA, 2009.  
51 See Telò, “Globalisation, New Regionalism and the Role of the European Union, op.cit., pp. 
7-13. 
52 T . G .  C a r p e n t e r ,  “ A  N e w  M o n r o e  D o c t r i n e ” ,  The National Interest, 21 September 2009, 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22208, retrieved 15/2/2010. 
53 See Escudé, “Realismo periferico- una filosofía de política exterior para estados débiles”, 
op.cit. 
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integrate Argentina in the NAFTA Agreement.54 Likewise, the consolidation of the US-
Chilean relations during the late 1990s, which have been bolstered by a bilateral free 
trade agreement (FTA) in 2003,55 was functional to prevent a deepened 
participation of Chile to Mercosur beyond its provisional status of associated country. 
Quite interestingly, instead of favoring Chile’s integration with Mercosur, the EU 
responded to the US selective bilateral approach through a parallel bilateral FTA, 
concluded in 2002.56 Such a reactive European approach hastened the emerging 
departure from pure interregionalism to more flexible cooperation frameworks. As a 
matter of fact, a partial shift to bilateralism was a pre-condition to start FTA 
negotiations with Chile, which, after Mexico, was given the status of a frontrunner in 
trade liberalization, in light of its commitment to democratic consolidation and free 
market reforms. 
As a result, there is ample empirical evidence highlighting the relevance of the “US 
factor” in shaping the European interregional policy towards the Southern Cone. 
More precisely, the structural pressures provided by the transatlantic link to the EU-led 
interregionalism can be observed as a constraint on the EU’s “governance 
externalization” policy as well as on the EU’s commitment to interregional “bloc 
building” strategy.  
 
3.1.2 The consequences of the Euro-American system constraints on EU-led 
interregional policy towards the Southern Cone  
 
As a consequence of US-linked systemic pressures, the EU shaped its South American 
trade policy through the acceleration of bilateral and interregional FTA negotiations. 
Undoubtedly, a “domino effect” dynamic moved EU and US regional trade policies 
towards Latin America.57 As a matter of fact, a parallelism between EU and US 
preferential trade negotiations occurred in the framework of several sub-regional 
contexts, i.e. Mexico, Chile, the Caribbean Community and Mercosur. As Garcia puts 
                                                            
54 Santander, Le régionalisme sud-américain, l’Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis, op.cit., p. 
153.  
55 On the significance of the US-Chile FTA for the American trade policy, see G.W. Harrison, 
T.F. Rutherford and D.G. Tarr, Chile's Regional Arrangements and the Free Trade Agreement 
of the Americas: The Importance of Market Access, World Bank Research Working Paper, no. 
2634, Washington, DC, 2001.  
56 The EU-Chile negotiations were not by chance accelerated in order to let the EU enter the 
Chilean market before the US.  
57 See R. Baldwin, “A Domino Theory of Regionalism”, CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 857, London, 
CEPR, 1993.  
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it with specific reference to the EU-Chile Association Agreement, “more than the 
economic advantage of EU business, the prospects of entering that [Latin American] 
lucrative market before the USA seem to be the main justifications for the efforts 
expended on the negotiation of a FTA”.58  
This observation could be generalized to the EU-Mercosur interregional free trade 
negotiations, which have been seen as a reactive European response to the start of 
the FTAA process after the 1991-1992 US-led bilateral talks.59 The timing of the 
successive EU-US FTA negotiations with Latin American sub-regional and bilateral 
partners constitutes the most valid indicator of the “domino effect” dynamic. More 
accurately, it shows that the US proactive trade strategy towards Latin America is in 
direct correlation with the EU’s acceleration of negotiations of regional trade 
agreements.60 In Alan Hardacre’s words, “the fluctuations in negotiations between 
the FTAA and EU-Mercosur are closely linked. As FTAA negotiations have speeded 
up, or slowed down, EU negotiations with Mercosur have followed suit”.61 There is 
ample empirical evidence that the number of formal and informal EU-Mercosur 
contacts nearly doubled during the years 2001-2003 when FTAA was speeding up; 
moreover, not by chance, the most significant tariff offer between the parties took 
place during the 9th interregional round of negotiations in March 2003.62    
Furthermore, the exogenous pressures exercised by the complex relationship 
between regionalism and multilateralism offer an additional explanatory driver 
behind the EU-US regional trade policies towards Latin America.63 Arguably, the 
pursuit of EU-US concomitant regional trade negotiations with an increasingly Brazil-
led Mercosur has been shaped by the persistent stalemate of the WTO Doha Round, 
where Brazil played a key role within the Group of 20, which adopted an offensive 
                                                            
58 M. Garcia, Trade in EU Foreign Relations: The EU-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Post-
Graduate Conference on European Foreign Policy, London, LSE, 2-4 July 2004. 
59 See R. Bouzas, “Las negociaciones commerciales externas de Mercosur : administrando 
una agenda congestionada”, in R. Roett (ed.), Mercosur : integracion regional y mercados 
mundiales, Buenos Aires, Altamira, 2002.  
60 P. Guerrieri and I. Caratelli, “EU's Regional Trade Strategy, the Challenges Ahead”, The 
International Trade Journal, vol. 20, no. 2, 2006, pp. 139-184.  
61 A. Hardacre, The Rise and Fall of Interregionalism in EU External Relations, Dordrecht, 
Republic of Letters Publishing, 2010, p. 90.  
62 Ibid., p. 197.  
63 The academic literature on the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism has 
flourished during the 1990s, either in a positive axiological connotation, seeing regionalism as 
a liberalizing phenomenon, or in a negative sense, seeing regions as “stumbling blocs” or 
fortresses. See, as paradigmatic contributions, J. Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991; and F. Bergsten, “Open Regionalism”, The World 
Economy, vol. 20, no. 5, 1997, pp. 545-565.  
  17 Emanuele Pollio 
stance in negotiations on the liberalization of trade in agriculture. Of course, the 
paralysis of multilateral negotiations pushed both the European and the American 
trade policies towards Mercosur. Nevertheless, in the short term, the uncertain fate of 
the Doha Round raises the question whether the transatlantic competitive trends 
might be considered as a longue durée tendency or whether they are more likely to 
act as an underpinning of transatlantic economic relations, if the Doha Round was 
successfully completed.64  
As a partial caveat, chronology should not be confused with causality. In light of the 
described multi-causality in EU-led interregional trade policies, the correlation 
between the US-linked pressures and the EU’s acceleration of its preferential trade 
policy towards Latin America, is hardly univocal. However, a clear short-term 
consequence seems to emerge: as Hardacre puts it, “since FTAA talks have derailed, 
EU-Mercosur have not been able to capitalize”.65 Nonetheless, closer attention to 
long-term effects might represent a better guide to understand the role of the “Euro-
American System” in constraining the EU-Mercosur pure interregional project.   
Whit this caveat in mind, it is likely that the institutional outcome of EU-Mercosur 
relations will reside in a flexible and hybrid model of “quasi-interregional” 
cooperation, closer to the US policy preference for “soft interregionalism”. Once 
again, there is a gap between the EU’s integrationist philosophy and the political 
reality of EU-Mercosur interregional relations, decisively shaped by the constraints of 
the “EU-US system”. Mercosur has not adequately followed the EU-backed programs 
of institutional strengthening and customs union’s consolidation. Analytically, the 
Mercosur regional polity remains inadequate to both EU-led deep interregionalism 
and US-led soft interregionalism. Far from the EU deep integrationist philosophy, 
Mercosur does not derive from genuinely transnational forces, but from a mere 
intergovernmental logic, which Malamud describes as Southern Cone “presidential 
diplomacy”.66 Nonetheless, unlike the North American regional model, Mercosur has 
irreversibly evolved beyond a merely trade-based construction, as it aspires to 
become a perfect customs union and a political “identity-building” bloc. On the 
                                                            
64 See A. Valladao and P. Guerrieri (eds.), EU-Mercosur Relations and the WTO Doha Round: 
Common Sectoral Interests and Conflicts, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006.   
65 Hardacre, The Rise and Fall of Interregionalism in EU External Relations, op.cit., p. 91. 
66 A. Malamud, “Presidentialism in the Southern Cone: A Hidden Cause for a Successful 
Experience”, in F. Laursen (ed.), Regional Integration,  Theoretical Perspectives, Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2003, pp. 53-73.   
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whole, Mercosur’s paths of interregional cooperation are likely to continue to 
oscillate between the EU and US diverging models.  
Bearing in mind the fundamental distinction between chronology and causality in 
regional and interregional trade negotiations, it is clear that EU-Mercosur relations 
are not mono-directionally constrained by the bounds of the Euro-American system. 
For this reason, an in-depth analysis of the structural constraints linked to the rise of 
Brazil is indispensable to clarify the implications of the changing “transatlantic 
triangle” power configuration and the alleged trends of the Southern Cone politics of 
new regionalism.  
 
3.2  The rise of Brazil and its impact on the Southern Cone politics of new 
regionalism 
 
3.2.1  The impact of Brazil’s emergence on EU-US competing interregionalisms 
The EU has consistently supported the institutional strengthening of Mercosur as a 
deeply institutionalized regional polity and a veritable interregional partner. 
Nevertheless, the transforming intra-regional dynamics within the Southern Cone are 
increasingly pressing the European Commission to adjust its traditional regional 
integration assistance policy. Such a recent policy adjustment essentially aims to 
take into account the emergence of Brazil’s regional leadership. As Eleonora 
Mesquita Ceia has pointed out, “Brazil’s engagement with Mercosur can be 
described as ambivalent”.67 On the one hand, Brazil has looked at the experience of 
the European integration process to foster a highly institutionalized regional 
cooperation framework in the Southern Cone. On the other hand, Brazil “has been 
systematically putting the brakes on the bloc’s institutional development towards a 
supranational structure”.68 
From a political perspective, Brazil is displaying an assertive intra-regional leadership 
which hinders the internal evolution of Mercosur both in EU-like and in NAFTA-like 
terms. In terms of intra-regional power structure, asymmetry is destined to widen 
                                                            
67 E. Mesquita Ceia, “The New Approach of the European Union towards Mercosur: What is 
Behind the Launch of the Strategic Partnership with Brazil and What Are Its Chances of Being 
Effective?”, paper presented at 2008 GARNET Conference, Brussels, 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/20879064/2008-GARNET-Conference-The-EU-in-International-
Affairs, p. 1.  
68 Mesquita Ceia, “The New Approach of the European Union towards Mercosur”, op.cit., p. 
13.  
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within Mercosur.69 Indeed, Brazil increasingly views Mercosur not as an integrationist 
objective per se but as a means to pursue other foreign policy objectives, such as a 
reinforcement of its bargaining power at the international stage. Malamud and 
Castro define this “ideational gap” as the intra-Mercosur cognitive dissonance 
between “existentialists” and “instrumentalists”.70 In particular, Malamud argues that 
the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance in Latin America “is aggravated by a 
historical propensity towards 'magical realism' and high rhetoric. Even though 
Mercosur was created to mitigate such tendencies, it has been lately drifting back 
again towards magical realism”.71  
In the framework of an emerging realist foreign policy approach, regional integration 
can be considered as an instrument to enhance Brazil’s international actorness and 
its relative bargaining power in multilateral and interregional negotiations. Brazil’s 
regional leadership in the South American politics of new regionalism can be 
defined, through a realist declination of the new regionalist approach, as “intra-
regional hegemony”.72 As a combined consequence of its new realist approach to 
international politics and its intra-regional hegemony, Brazil is gradually implementing 
a “policy of concentric circles” in Latin America, which hinders the European 
approach of pure interregionalism. 
In practice, the Brazilian approach to the integration of South America presents 
fundamental discrepancies with the EU-backed regional integration assistance 
policy. In multiplying regional integration initiatives in South America Brazil clearly 
diverts political and economic resources from the EU-preferred institutional 
strengthening of Mercosur. Moreover, far from the European “existentialist” 
connotation of regional cooperation, Brazil’s realist declination of new regionalism 
implies the tactical use of interregionalism in order to increase bargaining power 
within multilateral fora. Brazil does instrumentally conceive its own hybrid interregional 
                                                            
69 Santander, Le régionalisme sud-américain, l’Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis, op.cit., 
Appendix 1.  
70 A .  M a l a m u d  a n d  P .  C a s t r o ,  “ A r e  R e g i o n a l  B l ocs Leading from Nation States to Global 
Governance? A Skeptical View from Latin America”, Iberoamericana, Nordic Journal of Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 115-135.  
71 A. Malamud, “The internal agenda of Mercosur: interdependence, leadership and 
institutionalization, in J. Grace (ed.), Los nuevos enfoques de la integración: más allá del 
regionalismo. Quito, FLACSO, 2008, pp. 115-35. 
72 The role of the regional hegemon in leading the main intra-regional integration dynamics is 
highlighted by the realist school of thought, namely with reference to the European Franco-
German axis and to the role of the US in North America. See R. Gilpin, The Political Economy 
of International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987. 
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relations both in the economic and trade field, such as at the WTO, and in the 
security sphere, such as at the UN. As a member of both North-South and South-
South interregional cooperation frameworks (and in particular IBSA – India-Brazil-
South Africa), Brazil conceives itself as a bridge between developed and developing 
countries, which enhances its negotiating power thanks to its pivotal position.   
As a consequence of President Lula’s assertive leadership, Brazil successfully 
circumvented the FTAA process at the 2005 Summit, where the Brazilian dilatory 
approach has practically deadlocked the FTAA negotiation process.73 As 
Grabbendorf has rightly pointed out,74 the Lula Administration was not 
unconditionally hostile to FTAA, but interpreted it in a very different way than the US 
did: while the US pushed for a hub-and-spoke network which should have eventually 
resulted in trade liberalization in the western hemisphere, Brazil adopted a more 
gradual two-steps approach: first, through the creation of a South American Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA), Mercosur and the Andean Pact would liberalize trade between 
themselves; and only at a second stage a unified South American bloc could 
eventually start to negotiate with NAFTA countries on an equal basis.  
From a systemic perspective, the Brazil-led deadlock of FTAA impacted the EU-
Mercosur interregional trade negotiations as it deprived the EU from a structural 
pressure to pursue the negotiations. As the FTAA is no longer to be considered as a 
threat for the EU, the role of the EU as “external unifier” for the Mercosur regional bloc 
has consequently declined.  
 
3.2.2  From pure interregionalism to selective bilateralism: the 2007 EU-Brazil Strategic 
Partnership and its impact on EU-Mercosur interregional relations  
 
Moving to the impact of Brazil-linked constraints on the EU-Mercosur interregional 
relations, one might argue that the 2007 EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership provides 
evidence of a changing European approach towards South America, namely 
through the alleged shift from pure interregionalism to selective bilateralism.75 In 
Mesquita Ceia’s words, the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership “represents a clear change 
in EU strategy for dealing with Mercosur, since the Europeans have always favored a 
                                                            
73 Ibid.  
74 Grabbendorf, “Biregionalism and US Policy towards Latin America”, op.cit., p. 149.  
75 See in particular Santander, “EU-LA Relations”, op.cit. 
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multilateral bloc-to-bloc approach over a bilateral route in reaching agreements 
whit Latin American and Caribbean countries”.76 
Selective bilateralism in the context of EU-Mercosur relations would certainly 
constrain the EU’s South American agenda, as it would imply a realistic taking into 
account of the US- and Brazil-linked power politics. In this sense, the only possibility for 
the EU-Mercosur pure interregional partnership to survive lies in the ultimate nature of 
the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership and whether it is conceived as complementary to 
the Southern Cone regionalization process.77  
The common narrative about the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, which highlights the 
functional differentiation between the EU-Mercosur and the EU-Brazil cooperation 
frameworks, seems to be straightforward. In fact, from a technical perspective, 
Mercosur differs from mere trade-based FTAs in that it is on the way towards a 
complete a customs union. Mercosur’s institutional setting is thus not limited to a free 
trade area, whose members can freely negotiate external contractual trade 
obligations. Nevertheless, if one considers the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership from a 
more political standpoint, then the supposed “harmonic coexistence” between 
interregionalism and bilateralism in the framework of the EU’s relations with the 
Southern Cone becomes much more problematic. In particular, through a genuine 
political lens, one might easily recognize two key drivers behind the new European 
approach vis-à-vis Brazil: first, the necessity to find an agreement with Brazil to unlock 
the Doha Development Round and, second, a renewed concern with the 
destabilizing impact of populist regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia.78  
With regard to the South American politics of new regionalism, the potential 
accession of a Venezuelan-Bolivian axis to Mercosur was clearly pursued by the two 
prominent figures of the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas”, i.e. Presidents Hugo 
Chavez and Evo Morales, in order to foster a “new Mercosur” in opposition to the 
“old” pro-Western Mercosur. In the broader context of South American politics, the 
EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership implied the recognition of Brazil’s regional leadership 
as an element of “containment” of the rising populist regimes of Bolivia and 
                                                            
76 Mesquita Ceia, “The New Approach of the European Union towards Mercosur”, op.cit., p. 
2.  
77 M.A. Garcia, “The Strategic Partnership between Brazil and the European Union”, in G. 
Grevi and A. de Vasconcelos (eds.), Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism EU - Relations 
with Brazil, China, India and Russia, Chaillot Paper, no. 109, Paris, Institut d'études de sécurité 
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Venezuela. The highlighted European shift from pure interregionalism to selective 
bilateralism has met an increasingly widespread criticism amongst Brazil’s most 
significant Mercosur partner Argentina,79 but also other key players in the wider Latin 
America such as Venezuela and Mexico.  
This is why, in practice, the impact of Brazil’s emergence on the South American 
politics of new regionalism is threefold. First, the rise of Brazil tends to crystallize 
Mercosur’s lack of institutionalization; as the Brazilian concept of state sovereignty in 
international relations remains anchored in anti-supranationalism, Mercosur is likely to 
remain a sui generis model of regional polity, very deep horizontally, i.e. for a 
remarkable variety of issues tackled and for its advanced stage of integration, but 
still intimately intergovernmental in its institutional foundation. In pursuing its own 
policy for regional integration, the rising Brazil is clearly constraining the EU regional 
integration assistance policy, which aims, on the contrary, at the deep 
institutionalization of Mercosur.   
Second, the rise of Brazil significantly hindered the US-led Panamerican policy in 
successfully sidestepping FTAA. The Brazil-driven deadlock of FTAA negotiations 
certainly pushed the US shift from its western hemispheric policy to a “free traders 
coalition of the willing” strategy. This also deprived the EU of an exogenous pressure 
to pursue its interregional trade negotiation with Mercosur.  
Third, the recognition of Brazil’s regional leadership and global role has shaped the 
changing European approach vis-à-vis the “South American giant”, which implied to 
bilaterally deal with Brazil through the 2007 bilateral Strategic Partnership. Although 
Brazilian diplomacy tries to reassure the other Mercosur member states that “the EU-
Brazil Strategic Partnership is compatible with Brazil’s commitment to regional 
integration and will overall benefit Mercosur development”,80 the new privileged 
status conferred to Brazil engenders several constraints to EU-led interregionalism 
towards the Southern Cone, specifically in relation to the recognition of Brazil as a 
great power, while the European model of interregional relations was aimed at 
“transcending power inequalities through supranational institution building”,81 and 
the erosion of Mercosur’s internal political cohesion. In Alan Hardacre’s words, “the 
fact that the EU has felt it necessary to address Brazil bilaterally on the political level is 
                                                            
79 See Valladao, “The New Tordesillas Lines”, op.cit.  
80 Mesquita Ceia, “The New Approach of the European Union towards Mercosur”, op.cit., p. 
16. 
81 Gruegel, “New Regionalism and Modes of Governance”, op.cit., p. 604. 
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indicative of its interregional failings. […] As it had previously done in Asia, the EU has 
simply realigned its political relations with Brazil from the interregional to the bilateral 
level”.82 
 
4.  Conclusions: the “transatlantic triangle” as a brake on interregionalism 
This paper analyzed the extent to which the systemic constraints of the “transatlantic 
triangle” affect the EU’s interregional policy towards the Southern Cone, as 
conceived by the European Commission in terms of bloc-to-bloc or pure 
interregional relations, and how the rise of Brazil impacts the competing EU-US 
interregional strategies vis-à-vis the Southern Cone. The findings show that the 
changing “transatlantic triangle” relationship has a twofold impact in terms of 
structural constraints on EU-led interregionalism. First, in the absence of the US-linked 
structural pressures stemming from the FTAA negotiation process, the EU is expected 
to reduce its commitment to the political strengthening of the EU-Mercosur 
interregional partnership. Second, the rise of Brazil can effectively be considered as 
the key driver behind the European shift from pure interregionalism to selective 
bilateralism or hybrid interregionalism.  
In the framework of the EU’s governance externalization strategy towards the 
Southern Cone, the European shift to a “softer” interregional ideal type shows that 
EU-Mercosur relational patterns prove to be still constrained by US-linked systemic 
pressures. As a result of the competitive transatlantic regional dynamics, the 
European interregional policy vis-à-vis the Southern Cone has proved to be hardly 
proactive in the absence of FTAA-related exogenous pressures. The eventual 
accomplishment of the EU-Mercosur interregional free trade agreement (which has 
been recently re-launched under the Spanish EU Presidency 2010) could nonetheless 
challenge the weight of US-linked constraints.   
Intra-regionally, the rise of Brazil proved to display a “crystallizing effect” on 
Mercosur’s lack of institutionalization. In Freres and Sanahuja’s words, “despite the EU 
strategy, [Mercosur] remains a 'light' regionalism, which rejects the construction of 
strong regional institutions and the idea of supranationality in the basis of traditional 
notions of state sovereignty and the supposedly greater efficiency of 
                                                            
82 Hardacre, The Rise and Fall of Interregionalism in EU External Relations, op.cit., p. 242.  
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intergovernmental schemes”.83 Moreover, in the context of the EU-US interregional 
competition over the governance of the Sothern Cone, the rise of Brazil proved a 
significant structural constraint to both the US-led FTAA and EU-Mercosur interregional 
relations. While the Brazil-driven deadlock of FTAA negotiations provoked the US shift 
from Panamericanism to a “free traders coalition of the willing” approach, the EU felt 
obliged to accept the recognition of Brazil’s regional leadership and global role 
through the 2007 EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership.  
In light of these findings, it is worth briefly elaborating on what the Southern Cone 
case study can tell us in general about the role of interregionalism in EU external 
relations. As a generalizable trend, the impact of the “transatlantic triangular” 
relationship on EU-led interregionalism unambiguously implies a pessimistic outlook of 
interregionalism as a long-term relational pattern to foster global governance and 
favor the shift to pooled-and-shared-sovereignty-based regions which could found a 
regionalized multilateral global governance. Despite the apparent deepening of 
Mercosur, the EU has so far been short of a persuasive rationale to coherently pursue 
a pure interregional relationship towards the world’s most advanced regional polity 
outside Europe. This might foster the long-term decline of pure interregionalism in the 
EU external relations, as long as European policy preferences are called to face, 
sooner or later, the Westphalian reality of intra-regional power politics.  
Hence, the limits of interregionalism which Aggarwal and Fogarty outlined in relation 
to North America do approximately apply to the South American politics of new 
regionalism; in essence, “if the EU lacks a compelling reason to pursue an 
interregional strategy toward a region […] which already has its own regional 
institutions, how viable could interregionalism really be as a more general 
strategy?”84 Further research should address this fundamental question in relation to 
other key regional contexts.  
 
                                                            
83 C. Freres and J. Sanahuja, “Study on Relations between the European Union and Latin 
America: New Strategies and Perspectives”, Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 
2005, cited in Hardacre, The Rise and Fall of Interregionalism in EU External Relations, op.cit., p. 
243.  
84 Aggarwal and Fogarty, “The Limits of Interregionalism”, op.cit., p. 117.  
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